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Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 38 (Sept. 20, 
2007)1 
 
CORPORATE LAW – SECURITIES FRAUD 
 
Summary 
 
 Appeal from a district court order dismissing a securities fraud action. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed district court order dismissing Appellants’ securities fraud action. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 Appellants Nanopierce Technologies, Inc. brought several claims relating to securities 
fraud against Respondents for misuse of the Stock Borrower Program, which Appellants assert 
resulted in a dilutive effect of Nanopierce’s stock value. 
 The Securities Exchange Act of 19342 regulates and controls securities transactions in 
interstate commerce.  Congress amended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to include section 
17A, which called for the establishment of a national system to facilitate the clearance and 
settlement of securities transactions.  Agencies registered under Section 17A are self-regulatory 
agencies and stand in the stead of the Securities Exchange Commission3 to provide clearance 
and settlement of broker-to-broker securities transactions.4  Respondent’s subsidiaries, T
Depository Trust Company (DTC) and The National Securities Clearing Corporation (NSCC), 
are registered clearing agencies under Section 17A. 
he 
                                                
 The DTC primarily operates as a “stock depository” and maintains the physical stock 
certificates that brokers deposit on behalf of investors.5  The NSCC, by contrast, actually 
facilitates the clearance and settlement of securities by both acting as a broker intermediary and 
by tracking brokers’ transactions.  The NSCC operates as a broker intermediary by assuming 
payment and delivery obligations of individual brokers.  The NSCC tracks transactions by 
calculating individual brokers’ payments or delivery obligations due for particular securities over 
a designated period.  After payment and delivery obligations are calculated, the NSCC transmits 
these figures to the DTC.  In instances in which delivery obligations are due, the DTC 
automatically performs a comparison of the individual broker’s delivery obligations with the 
amount of shares the individual broker has on deposit.   
If the broker has sufficient shares on deposit to fulfill his or her delivery obligation, those 
shares are sent through the NSCC to the DTC account of the buying broker.  If the broker has 
sold more shares than he or she has on deposit, however, the broker must then exercise one of 
two options.  One option permits the broker to “buy-in” by purchasing the requisite number of 
 
1 By Jamie Zimmerman. 
2 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2000). 
3 See Dexter v. Depository Trust and Clearing Corp., 406 F. Supp. 2d 260, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
4 15 U.S.C. §78q-1(b)(3)(A) (2000). 
5 Stock certificates are held by the DTC in the name of the DTC’s nominee, Cede & Co.  For efficiency purposes, 
changes in stock ownership are only recorded electronically. 
shares owed on his or her delivery obligation in the open market.  In the alternative, the broker 
can wait for shares to become available through the NSCC as it processes transactions.   
 In effort to eradicate situations in which brokers sell more shares than they have on 
deposit, the NSCC created the Stock Borrower Program (SBP).  The SBP permits brokers to lend 
shares from their DTC accounts to another broker before a failure to deliver takes place.  In 
effect, the SBP permits brokers to loan securities that they have on deposit with the DTC to 
cover a fellow broker’s delivery obligation. 
 Appellants argued that Respondents manipulated the SBP by generating so-called 
“phantom shares” that diluted the value of Nanopierce’s stock.  Appellants assert that 
Respondents misrepresent their compliance with the SBP procedures as follows:  (1) the NSCC 
falsely represents its compliance with curing delivery obligations by purchasing stocks from the 
open market, asserting that the NSCC instead buys broker requests through the SBP; (2) 
Respondents falsely represent that buying broker requests are purchased through the open 
market, asserting that Respondents instead purchase stocks through the SBP; (3) Respondents 
falsely represent that they efficiently clear and settle securities transactions, asserting that 
Respondents permit delivery commitments to remain unfulfilled for extended periods of time; (4) 
Respondents falsely represent the number of shares they actually retain, asserting that 
Respondents do not include shares “on loan” to other brokers with outstanding delivery 
obligations in their figures.  In addition, Appellants assert the following non-misrepresentation 
based claims:  engagement in unfair trade practices, market manipulation, conversion, intentional 
interference with contractual relations, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing, and conspiracy. 
 The district court dismissed Appellants’ claims, holding that federal law pertaining to 
clearance and settlement of securities preempted Appellants’ claims.  This appeal followed. 
 
Discussion 
 
 The issue before the court was whether Section 17A of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 preempts Appellants’ state law claims.  The preemption doctrine provides that federal law 
trumps conflicting, but otherwise valid, state law.6  Preemption is a question of law and is 
subject to de novo re 7view.  
                                                
At the outset, the Court noted that although the SBP and the rules prescribing its 
operation are not federal law per se, the Securities Exchange Commission promulgated the SBP 
at the direction of Congress pursuant to Section 17A, and thus the SBP trumps otherwise valid 
and conflicting state law.8  The court noted that although Congress did not expressly preempt 
state law in this arena by statutory language, Appellants’ state law claims could still be impliedly 
preempted.  The court then discussed the implied preemption doctrines of field preemption and 
conflict preemption in turn.   
 
 
6 The preemption doctrine arises from the Supremacy Clause, found in Article VI of the United States Constitution.  
The Supremacy Clause provides “the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; . . . any 
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”  See also Crosby v National 
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372 (2000) (stating that “[a] fundamental principle of the Constitution is that 
Congress has the power to preempt state law”). 
7 SIIS v. United Exposition Services Co., 109 Nev. 28, 30, 846 P.2d 294, 295 (1993). 
8 See Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Labs., 471 U.S. 707, 713 (1985) (noting that “state laws can be 
pre-empted by federal regulations as well as by federal statutes”). 
Field Preemption 
 
 State law is impliedly preempted under the doctrine of field preemption in instances in 
which Congress has legislated in an arena in such a manner that the federal interest is so 
dominant that it can be said to “occupy a legislative field.”9   
 In the present case, the court concluded that although Congressional legislation indicates 
that Congress intended to occupy much of the field in the arena of clearing and settling securities 
transactions, the statutory scheme does not warrant the inference that Congress intended to 
occupy this entire field.  To the contrary, after analyzing the statutory scheme, the court 
concluded that Congress intended to preserve all non-conflicting state securities laws.   
The court specifically referenced Section 78bb(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
in support of its finding.  Section 78bb(a) provides:  “[N]othing in this [Act] shall affect the 
jurisdiction of the securities commission . . . of any State over any securities or any person 
insofar as it does not conflict with the provisions of this [Act].”10  In addition, the court relied 
upon a provision of Section 17A that provided for the construction of this provision to the same 
effect.11  Moreover, the court referenced an amendment to Section 17A in 1990, which also 
provided for states to supplement the federal statutory scheme in the field of clearing and settling 
transactions.12 
 
Conflict Preemption   
 
 State law is impliedly preempted under the doctrine of conflict preemption when a party 
cannot conceivably comply with both applicable federal law and its intended purpose as well as 
applicable state law.13  The court performed a claim-by-claim analysis of Appellants’ claims to 
determine whether compliance with applicable state law presented an obstacle in complying with 
Section 17A’s purpose and effect.14  The court divided Appellants’ claims into two separate 
groups, misrepresentation claims and non-misrepresentation claims, and analyzed them in turn.   
 The court assessed each of Appellants’ misrepresentation claims and concluded that the 
NSCC preempted all claims.  The court construed each claim, in essence, to challenge either the 
procedures or rules prescribed by the NSCC.  The court reasoned that the Securities Exchange 
Commission approved the procedures and rules of the NSCC and thus any state regulations in 
conflict with the operation or existence of the SBP are necessarily preempted.   
 Just as the court concluded that each of Appellants’ misrepresentation claims were 
preempted for confliction with the SBP, the court also found that all of Appellants’ non-
misrepresentation based claims were preempted because each of those claims also overtly 
challenged the operation or existence of the SBP.   
 
                                                 
9 Nanopierce Tech. v. Depository Trust, 123 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 38 (Sept. 20, 2007); See also Cipollone v. Liggett 
Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992); Hillsborough County, 471 U.S. at 713. 
10 Accord Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983) (interpreting Section 78bb(a) as providing 
that Congress “rejected the notion that the express remedies of the securities law would pre-empt all other rights of 
action”).   
11 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(d)(4) (2000). 
12 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f)(1) (2000); 15 U.S.C. § 78q-1(f)(3) (2000).   
13 Crosby v National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373 (2000). 
14 Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 524-30 (the Court performed a claim-by-claim analysis to determine whether federal law 
preempted state law in that case). 
Concurring/Dissenting Opinions 
 
HARDESTY, J., with whom DOUGLAS, J. agrees, concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
 Justice Hardesty generally agreed with the majority’s analysis of the doctrine of conflict 
preemption.  He dissented, however, with the majority’s characterization of Appellants’ claims 
as overtly attacking the language of the NSCC.  Justice Hardesty reasoned that Appellants’ 
claims did not directly challenge the language of any of the NSCC rules, but rather the manner in 
which Respondents misrepresent their compliance with those rules.  Justice Hardesty called for 
the reversal of the district court order with respect to Appellants’ misrepresentation claims and 
remand of the matter for further proceedings. 
 
Conclusion 
 
 The court concluded that the doctrine of conflict preemption operated to preempt all of 
Appellants’ state law claims because it found that a party could not be in compliance with both 
the federal enactments in the arena of clearing and settling securities as well as Appellants’ state 
law claims.  The court reasoned that Appellants’ claims were preempted because each claim in 
essence challenged the operation or existence of the SBP, which the court found to enjoy the 
same status as federal law in a preemption analysis as the Securities Exchange Commission 
promulgated the SBP.  Therefore, the court affirmed the district court order dismissing 
Appellants’ securities fraud action.   
 
